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VIRTUAL TAKINGS: THE COMING FIFTH 
AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO NET 
NEUTRALITY REGULATION 
 
Daniel A. Lyons 
 
Abstract:  ―Net neutrality‖ refers to the principle that broadband 
providers should not limit the content and applications available over the 
Internet.  Long a rallying cry of techies and academics, it has become 
one of the central pillars of the Obama Administration‘s 
telecommunications policy.  The Federal Communications 
Commission‘s efforts to regulate the ―onramp to the Internet‖ have 
attracted significant attention from the telecommunications industry and 
the academic community, which have debated whether the proposed 
restrictions violate broadband providers‘ First Amendment rights.  But 
there is an additional constitutional implication of net neutrality that has 
not yet been sufficiently addressed in the scholarly literature: the Takings 
Clause.  
  
This article argues that under the Supreme Court‘s Takings Clause 
jurisprudence, the Commission‘s proposed net neutrality rules effect a 
permanent physical occupation of private broadband networks and 
therefore take broadband providers‘ property without just compensation.  
In essence, net neutrality would grant Internet content providers a 
permanent virtual easement across privately-owned broadband networks 
to deliver content to end-users.  It thus would deprive broadband 
providers of the right to exclude others from their networks—a right that 
the Court‘s takings jurisprudence has repeatedly dubbed ―one of the most 
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized 
as property.‖  At the very least, the Takings Clause issue raises a serious 
constitutional question regarding the Commission‘s authority to adopt 
net neutrality regulations without clear authority from Congress to do so.  
The Commission should therefore seek explicit Congressional approval 
before promulgating net neutrality rules, rather than continuing to 
freelance at the periphery of its regulatory authority. 
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VIRTUAL TAKINGS: THE COMING FIFTH 
AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO NET NEUTRALITY 
REGULATION 
 
Daniel A. Lyons
*
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Born in the nether world of law review articles and academic 
conferences, net neutrality has quickly matured to become one of the 
Obama Administration‘s defining telecommunications issues.  The Federal 
Communications Commission has proposed rules to regulate what new 
Chairman Julius Genachowski has described as the ―onramp‖ to the 
Internet: the privately-held telecommunications networks that connect 
individual consumers to the Internet‘s public servers.1  Termed the ―Open 
Internet Initiative,‖ these proposed rules would limit the discretion of 
broadband providers such as Verizon, AT&T, and Comcast to regulate the 
terms of access to their networks by Internet content providers such as 
Google and Hulu.
2
 
Proponents of net neutrality have long argued that such restrictions 
are necessary to prevent broadband providers from leveraging their market 
power to adversely affect Internet development and operation.
3
  Net 
neutrality opponents, however, have questioned the practical effects of such 
proposals and have argued that, for the most part, net neutrality seems to be 
a solution in search of a problem.
4
  Opponents also recognize that billions of 
dollars have been invested over the past decade to build a high-speed 
broadband network, and much more is still required to achieve the 
administration‘s goal of ubiquitous broadband access.5  Such investment is 
retarded by regulations that restrict broadband providers‘ ability to recover 
                                               
*
 Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  This article was made possible by a grant 
from the BC Law School Fund, support which is gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks to Henry 
Weissmann for guidance and assistance during the early stages of this project.  Thanks also to Crystal 
Lyons, Fred Yen, and to participants at a workshop at Boston University Law School for comments and 
feedback on earlier drafts of this article.   
1 See In Re Preserving the Open Internet: Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 24 FCC Rcd. 13064 (2009) (notice) (hereafter ―Net Neutrality NOPR‖).  
2
 Id. 
3
 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, In Support of Network Neutrality, 3 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 185 (2007); Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet 
Neutral? Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575 (2007). 
4
 See, e.g., Wu and Yoo, supra note 3. 
5
 See, e.g., Julius Genachowski, Broadband: Our Enduring Engine for Prosperity and Opportunity, 
Prepared Remarks at NARUC Winter Conference, February 16, 2010 (available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296262A1.pdf) (announcing Commission goal 
of providing 100 megabits per second broadband access to 100 million homes by 2020). 
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these costs through enhanced services or tiered-access pricing.  With the 
promulgation of the Commission‘s Open Internet Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking,
6
 this debate has finally spilled over from the pages of law 
reviews and onto the docket of the government‘s chief telecommunications 
regulator, the Federal Communications Commission. 
The net neutrality debate has also sometimes assumed a 
constitutional dimension, focusing primarily upon dueling First Amendment 
concerns.  Net neutrality proponents highlight the right of consumers to 
send and receive virtual speech free of ―censorship‖ by broadband 
providers, in the form of blocked or degraded transmission of certain 
internet applications or content.
7
  Others argue that net neutrality would 
infringe upon broadband providers‘ own First Amendment rights to speak 
and engage in editorial control of content distributed over their networks.
8
  
While the Supreme Court has recognized First Amendment protection for 
network operators in similar contexts,
9
 it is unclear how these decisions 
apply in the net neutrality context.  
But there is an additional constitutional limitation whose import has 
not been sufficiently addressed in the net neutrality literature: the Takings 
Clause.  The Open Internet initiative would compel broadband providers to 
provide third parties access to their networks, and to do so on the same 
terms as the broadband providers‘ own proprietary content.  Net neutrality 
thus deprives broadband providers of the right to exclude others from their 
networks—a right that the Court‘s takings jurisprudence has repeatedly 
dubbed ―one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property.‖10  In essence, net neutrality grants 
content providers a permanent virtual easement across privately-owned 
broadband networks to deliver content to end-users.  In other contexts, the 
Supreme Court has made clear that ―a ‗permanent physical occupation‘ has 
occurred‖ for Fifth Amendment purposes ―where individuals are given a 
permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro‖ across private property.11  
                                               
6
 See Net Neutrality NOPR, supra note 1. 
7
 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Remarks at FCC Workshop on Speech, Democratic Engagement, and the 
Open Internet, December 15, 2009 (available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/12/remarks-at-fcc-
workshop-on-speech.html). As discussed infra, all parties agree on the need to block harmful content 
such as obscene material and spam.  The net neutrality debate revolves around delivery of lawful 
content. 
8
 See, e.g., Randolph J. May, Commentary: Net Neutrality Mandates: Neutering the First Amendment in 
the Digital Age, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 197, 203-04 (2007). 
9
 See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner II); Turner Broadcasting Sys., 
Inc. v. FCC 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (Turner I) (holding that First Amendment protects cable operators‘ 
right of editorial control over content transmitted across their networks, but that statute requiring cable 
companies to carry certain local broadcast channels is content-neutral restriction that satisfies 
intermediate scrutiny). 
10
 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (quoting Kaiser Aetna 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)); see also Nollan v. Calif. Coastal Comm‘n, 483 U.S. 825, 
831 (1987). 
11
 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832. 
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Net neutrality proponents may be correct that ―[u]nder the First Amendment 
Congress can make both telephone and cable companies into common 
carriers who must take on all traffic‖ and therefore as a constitutional 
matter, ―Congress can certainly require a much milder non-discrimination 
requirement like network neutrality.‖12  But ―it is a separate question, 
however, whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights 
that compensation must be paid.‖13 
This article argues that under the Supreme Court‘s Takings Clause 
jurisprudence, the Commission‘s proposed net neutrality rules likely effect a 
permanent physical occupation of private broadband networks and therefore 
constitute a per se taking of broadband providers‘ property.  Alternatively, 
net neutrality may constitute a regulatory taking under the Penn Central ad-
hoc balancing test.
14
  If so, the Commission lacks the authority to adopt its 
proposed regulations because it cannot assure that just compensation will be 
paid to broadband providers.  At the very least, the Takings Clause issue 
raises a serious constitutional question regarding the Commission‘s 
authority to adopt net neutrality regulations sua sponte, particularly when 
combined with potential First Amendment issues and the D.C. Circuit‘s 
recent skepticism regarding the Commission‘s authority to regulate internet 
providers generally under Title I.  Given this serious constitutional question, 
this article recommends that the Commission seek explicit Congressional 
authorization for its Open Internet initiative rather than continuing to 
freelance at the periphery of its ancillary Title I authority.   
 
I. BROADBAND DEVELOPMENT AND THE NET NEUTRALITY DEBATE 
 
Before examining the constitutional implications of the 
Commission‘s recent foray into net neutrality, it is helpful to chart a brief 
history of the development of the broadband network and the advent of the 
net neutrality debate.   
 
A. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
 
In one sense, the origins of net neutrality concerns lie in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996,
15
 Congress‘s attempt to overhaul the 
telecommunications industry to meet the anticipated challenges of the 
twenty-first century.
16
  At the time, the wire-based telecommunications 
industry was divided into two discrete ―monoline‖ segments: wireline 
                                               
12
 See Balkin, supra note 7. 
13
 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425. 
14
 Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127-28 (1978). 
15
 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996). 
16
 Daniel A. Lyons, Technology Convergence and Federalism: Who Will Decide the Future of 
Telecommunications Regulation?, 43 U. MICH. J. LAW REF. 383, 383-84 (2010).  
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telephone companies, which offered voice service as a common carrier over 
the publicly-switched telephone network under Title II of the 
Communications Act of 1934, and cable companies, which offered wire-
based video service under Title VI of the Act.
17
   
Before the 1996 Act, a quarter-century of regulatory policy had 
reinforced the sharp voice/video divide in the telecommunications industry.  
The Commission had enforced a general ban on cross-ownership of 
telephone and cable networks since 1970, with limited exceptions.
18
  The 
1984 Cable Act expanded and reinforced this ban by generally prohibiting 
common carriers such as the local telephone companies from providing 
video programming over their networks.
19
  Similarly, most local telephone 
companies had received exclusive telephone franchises from states in 
exchange for rate regulation and universal service obligations, with the 
FCC‘s blessing.20 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 sought to infuse the industry 
with competition at every level, in part by demolishing the artificial 
video/voice barrier and instilling ―intermodal‖ competition between 
telephone companies and cable operators.  The 1996 Act repealed the Cable 
Act‘s prohibition on the provision of video services over telephone lines.21  
As Peter Huber notes, this provision came just in the nick of time: several 
federal courts had held that this prohibition violated the First Amendment 
rights of telephone companies, and the issue had been argued before the 
Supreme Court in December of 1995, where the general consensus was that 
the justices were likely to agree, perhaps unanimously.
22
  At the same time, 
the 1996 Act preempted all state and local laws that ―prohibit or have the 
effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide interstate or 
intrastate telecommunications service.‖23  This provision eliminated state 
protection of local telephone monopolies and effectively allowed cable 
companies to enter the telephone business.   
At the time, however, physical network constraints made 
intermodal competition seem more of a long-term aspiration than a 
realistically achievable goal.  In particular, local telephone networks relied 
primarily upon twisted-pair copper wires.  These wires were adequate for 
conveying voice conversations but lacked the speed and capacity necessary 
                                               
17
 See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. 
18
 See Application of Telcos, 21 FCC Rcd. at 307 (1970). 
19
 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (repealed 1996); see PETER W. HUBER et al, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 
1996 SPECIAL REPORT 85 (1996).   
20
 See HUBER, supra note 19, at 86. 
21
 Id. at 84. 
22
 Id. at 84-85.  The adoption of the Telecommunications Act led the Court to dismiss the case as moot.  
Id.; see US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 516 U.S. 
1155 (1996); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated, 
516 U.S. 415 (1996). 
23
 47 U.S.C. § 253(a). 
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to deliver consistent, high-quality video signals comparable to those of the 
cable company.  By comparison, the coaxial cable deployed by cable 
companies had somewhat higher bandwidth than their telephone 
counterparts.  So while technological challenges inhibited telephone 
companies‘ proposed expansion into video service, cable companies found 
it easier to expand in the other direction.  By 2002, the cable industry had 
attracted approximately two million customers for phone service, suggesting 
that the 1996 Act‘s dream of intermodal competition could soon reach at 
least the voice segment of the communications market.
24
 
 
B. The Growth of Broadband 
 
Intermodal competition was boosted by the advent of a third service 
that the 1996 Act treated almost as an afterthought:
25
 Internet access.  
Residential internet access became commercially available in the mid-
1990s.
26
  End-users initially accessed the Internet through ―narrowband‖ 
dial-up connections that transferred information at relatively slow speeds.  
In short, a dial-up end-user would use a computer modem to call a local 
telephone number controlled by an Internet Service Provider (ISP) such as 
America On-Line.  ISP equipment would then convert that analog telephone 
call into an internet connection, allowing the end-user‘s computer to 
transmit and receive data.
27
  But as consumers became more web-savvy and 
demanded more (and more intensive) internet applications, dial-up ISPs 
found themselves facing the same problem that stalled intermodal 
competition for video service: analog calls over twisted-pair copper wire 
simply lacked the capacity to meet consumers‘ growing appetites for 
bandwidth-intensive applications. 
To satisfy this consumer demand, cable companies began to offer 
broadband service over their coaxial cable lines, which were capable of 
higher data transmission speeds than the legacy telephone company 
networks.
28
  As cable modem service caught on, telephone companies 
                                               
24
 See History of Cable Television, available at 
http://www.ncta.com/About/About/HistoryofCableTelevision.aspx. 
25
 See Christopher Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 1, 1 (2005) (―Having largely 
failed to take the Internet into consideration when enacting the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Congress is preparing to reenter the fray as it begins work on its second major overhaul of the 
communications laws in less than a decade.‖) (discussing then-recently proposed net neutrality 
legislation).  
26
 See Michael J. Santorelli, Rationalizing the Municipal Broadband Debate, 3 I/S: A Journal of Law 
and Policy for the Information Society 43, 51 (2007).  As Santorelli notes, AOL is often credited as the 
first company to offer mass-market dial-up internet access. 
27
 See id. at 51; see also G. Keith Evans, How Does Dialup Work?, available at 
http://www.ehow.com/how-does_4570408_dial-up-work.html. 
28
 See Santorelli, supra note 26, at 53.  As Santorelli explains, coaxial cable is capable of transmitting 
both cable television signals and broadband signals at the same time over the same wire, by sending 
them at different frequencies.  Equipment at the end-user‘s home (specifically, a cable set-top box and a 
cable modem) can distinguish between frequencies and route each signal stream to the appropriate end-
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developed Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) Service as a competing broadband 
platform that transmitted data more efficiently over their copper wires.  At 
the risk of simplification, DSL did for copper wires what cable modems did 
for coaxial cable: it separated information traveling over the wire into two 
streams, which allowed data to move more rapidly through the network with 
minimal interference from voice traffic.
29
 
 
C. The “Open Access” Debate 
 
The advent of broadband communication threatened to render dial-
up ISPs such as AOL obsolete.  DSL and cable modem service offered 
customers access to the Internet at much greater speeds than dial-up ISPs 
could offer.  Moreover, broadband internet access was often bundled with 
video or voice service, meaning customers could simply add internet service 
to their existing accounts without needing to establish service with a 
separate provider.
30
  To survive, ISPs sought to gain access on a wholesale 
level to the facilities that cable and telephone companies used to provide 
broadband service, so they could package that high-speed transmission with 
their own internet access service and thus compete in the broadband market.
 
31
  Their arguments for ―open access‖ relied upon the regulatory uncertainty 
surrounding the proper classification of broadband service under the 
Communications Act.
32
  In some ways, these arguments laid the 
groundwork for the current net neutrality debate. 
In 1998, the Commission ruled that the transmission component of 
DSL service—the carrying of internet data signals over the telephone 
company‘s DSL lines—was a ―telecommunications service‖ under Title II 
of the Act and therefore subject to common carrier  obligations.
33
  The 
upshot of the ruling was that, while telephone companies could sell 
broadband internet access directly to consumers, they also had to make their 
DSL lines available as a wholesale input to unaffiliated ISPs to bundle with 
                                                                                                             
user device.  Id.  Because the broadband signal effectively receives its own ―path‖ on the cable line, the 
line can transmit significantly more data at significantly greater speeds than was available over dial-up. 
29
 Equipment at the telephone company office recognizes the separate digital signal and allows it to 
bypass the switches that the company uses to route voice traffic.  Filters in the end-user‘s home similarly 
separate voice and data traffic and route the appropriate signal to the appropriate device.
29
  By giving 
data traffic a dedicated channel on the copper wire, free of potential interference from analog voice 
traffic, and allowing that data traffic to bypass the switches that route voice signals, DSL service boosts 
data traffic to speeds comparable to cable modem service. 
30
 See High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling & Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002) (hereafter ―Cable Modem Order‖), at 4804 ¶ 10.  
31
 See In the Matters of Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications 
Capability, 13 F.C.C. Rcd. 24012, 24016–17, ¶¶ 8-10 (1998). 
32
 See generally id. 
33Id. at 24030–31, ¶¶  35–37. The FCC explained that high-speed Internet access via DSL is actually two 
bundled services: access to the Internet, which is a largely unregulated Title I information service, and 
underlying transmission of information over the DSL line, which is a Title II common carrier service. Id. 
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their own internet access services.
34
  But the Commission refused to offer 
similar guidance regarding cable modem service, which left open the 
question whether cable companies were subject to a similar ―open access‖ 
requirement.
35
 
The question whether unaffiliated ISPs should receive access to 
cable networks raged for years in academic circles, Commission 
proceedings, and multiple court cases.
36
  Finally in 2005, the Supreme Court 
upheld the Commission‘s determination that cable modem service was 
properly classified under Title I and therefore not subject to common carrier 
requirements.
 37
  The Commission reasoned that open access requirements 
were unnecessary in light of the robust market for broadband access, and 
could in fact prove harmful if excessive regulation hampers future 
broadband deployment.
38
  Having received the Supreme Court‘s blessing, 
the Commission promptly re-classified DSL service as a Title I rather than a 
Title II service,
39
 and explained that wireless internet access and broadband 
over power lines would be similarly classified.
40
  In this way, the 
Commission hoped to ―establish a consistent regulatory framework across 
broadband platforms by regulating like services in similar manner.‖41 
Thus freed of the requirement to sell portions of their bandwidth at 
wholesale rates to competitors, and assured of the Commission‘s position 
that robust competition among providers and a light regulatory touch would 
maximize broadband deployment, the cable and telephone industries 
invested tens of billions of dollars in the last decade, mostly since the 2005 
ruling, to upgrade their networks in response to burgeoning consumer 
demand.
42
  Specifically, both industries began upgrading their networks to 
use fiber-optic cable.  Unlike twisted-pair copper and coaxial cables, fiber-
                                               
34
 Id.; see Lyons, supra note 16, at 403. 
35
 See Lyons, supra note 16, at 404. 
36
 See Jonathan H. Nuechterlein, The Digital Broadband Migration: Information Policy for the Next 
Administration, 7 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. Law 19, 25 (2009).  For a more detailed discussion of the 
open access debate and the problems caused by this regulatory uncertainty, see Lyons, supra note 16, at 
403-04. 
37
 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005), aff'g Cable 
Modem Order.  The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission‘s conclusion that, while cable modem 
service ―used telecommunications‖ in the sense that the transportation of information from one point to 
another is an essential component of the service, this transport was only one component of integrated 
cable modem service and not conceptually separate from the end-product.. 
38
 See Cable Modem Order, supra note 30. 
39
 See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C. 
Rcd. 14853 (2005). 
40
 See In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireless 
Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901 (2007) (hereafter ―Wireless Broadband Order‖); In re United Power Line 
Council‘s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of Broadband Over Power Line, 
21 FCC Rcd. 13281 (2006).  
41
 See Wireless Broadband Order, supra note 40 ¶ 2. 
42
 Thomas W. Hazlett and Anil Caliskan, Natural Experiments in U.S. Broadband Regulation, 7 REVIEW 
OF NETWORK ECONOMICS 460, 477 (2008) (analyzing growth in broadband opportunities and 
competition following Commission‘s order to lift Title II obligations on DSL service). 
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optic cables do not depend upon the transmission of electricity through 
metal to send voice, video, or data signals.  Instead, the signals are 
transmitted by beams of light traveling at very high speeds through hollow, 
flexible glass tubes as thin as a human hair, thousands of which are bundled 
together into a typical fiber-optic line.   
Fiber-optic cable held the promise of a next-generation broadband 
service that delivered data at speeds even greater than DSL or cable modem 
service.
43
  But fiber-optic cables are expensive, several times the cost of 
their copper-wire and coaxial counterparts.  Cable and especially telephone 
companies were reluctant to assume such a significant, multi-year capital 
improvement project unless they could be reasonably certain they could 
earn a return on that investment.
44
  AT&T and Verizon faced the most 
costly upgrade projects, needing to replace literally millions of miles of 
copper wire with fiber-optic cable, and therefore looked to additional 
revenue streams beyond mere data transport to support that investment.  
This way, telephone companies could finally achieve Congress‘s dream of 
creating true intermodal competition in the multichannel video market, by 
becoming the cable industry‘s first true wire-based competitors.45 
 
D. Origins of Net Neutrality 
                                               
43
 See JIM BALLER & CASEY LIDE, BALLER HERBST LAW GROUP, CAPTURING THE PROMISE OF 
BROADBAND FOR NORTH CAROLINA AND AMERICA 11 (2008) (―Of all current technologies, the most 
robust is fiber optics. Hair-thin glass fiber optic cables can carry virtually infinite amounts of digital 
information encoded on light beams traveling at nearly the speed of light between lasers at the ends of 
the cables.‖), quoted in Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 908 
n.183 (2009). 
44
 As Michael Santorelli has noted, fiber-optic cable is not a new phenomenon.  The telephone 
companies deployed some ―rings‖ of fiber-optic cable as early as the 1980s to carry voice calls on 
heavy-traffic long distance corridors.  See Michael J. Santorelli, Rationalizing the Municipal Broadband 
Debate, 3 I/S: A J. OF L. & PUB. POL. FOR THE INFO. SOC. 43, 62 (2007).   But the telephone companies 
were wary of over-investing in fiber beyond those corridors, in part because of the lessons of the dot-
com boom.  During the 1990s, start-up companies laid millions of miles of fiber throughout the country, 
with dreams that the new network would carry a wide range of next-generation Internet applications.  
When the dot-com bubble burst, many of these companies went bankrupt, stranding these networks and 
causing what has become known as a ―fiber glut.‖  See id. at 62-63.  The telephone companies were 
perhaps wary of making the same mistake, and therefore invested more heavily in fiber to individual 
neighborhoods and homes only once it became clear that the vaunted ―triple-play‖ of voice, video, and 
internet service would guarantee a return on this huge investment. 
45
 Through Project U-Verse (formerly known as Project Lightspeed), AT&T has embarked upon a fiber-
to-the-node (FTTN) model that uses fiber-optic cable from the local exchange office to neighborhood 
nodes, then traditional twisted-pair copper wire from the neighborhood node to individual homes. See 
http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=5838. Verizon‘s FiOS program is centered upon a more 
ambitious, and more expensive, fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) system that relies on fiber-optic cable 
exclusively throughout much of the FiOS footprint. See http://www22.verizon.com/residential/fiostv.  
Both companies have heavily touted their respective video offerings as a significant source of future 
revenue and an essential component of a profitable fiber-based network.  These investments differ in 
kind from the type of fiber installations that brought about the ―fiber glut‖ of the 1990s: the dot-com 
companies largely invested in redundant (and therefore inefficient) networks between hubs along what 
they anticipated to be high-traffic corridors, without installing additional fiber from those hubs to 
individual neighborhoods or consumers.  See Santorelli, supra note 44, at 63. 
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As the Open Access debate played out, and it became clear that the 
Commission intended to take a light regulatory touch to broadband, 
commentators such as Lawrence Lessig and Tim Wu grew increasingly 
concerned with the possibility that broadband providers would someday use 
their control of their networks to discriminate against certain content 
providers.
46
  While there is an incalculable number of providers of 
applications and services operating on the Internet, the broadband path from 
the Internet to end-user consumers must necessarily go through one of a 
handful of companies that operate the nation‘s telecommunications 
networks.  Lessig, Wu, and others are concerned that, should broadband 
providers use this control to block or degrade certain applications or 
content, it would impair the creativity and innovation in applications and 
content that have helped the Internet grow so explosively.
47
  Chairman 
Genachowski has analogized this concern as the need to regulate the 
―onramps to the Internet.‖48 
Net neutrality opponents‘ response has been two-fold.  First, they 
argue that net neutrality seems largely to be a solution in search of a 
problem.  Broadband providers generally have not blocked the Internet‘s 
―onramps‖ to particular applications or content.49  As the Commission has 
noted, the broadband market is competitive, with most American consumers 
having a choice of two or more providers.
50
  Any broadband provider that 
blocks or degrades services that consumers want is likely to face market-
based repercussions as consumers flock to their competitors (in addition to 
possible legal action if the interference violates antitrust law).
51
  And that 
competitive pressure will only grow as wireless broadband matures into a 
legitimate third platform for broadband service.
52
   
Second, broadband providers highlight the tens of billions of dollars 
they have invested in building and maintaining the fiber-optic networks that 
make broadband internet access possible.  This is a capital risk that 
                                               
46
 See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
141, 145-46, 165-68 (2003) (arguing that net neutrality is needed for innovation and proposing an 
antidiscrimination rule to achieve net neutrality by ―forbid[ding] broadband operators, absent a showing 
of harm, from restricting what users do with their Internet connection‖ ); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE 
FUTURE OF IDEAS 46-48, 155-76, 246-49 (2001). 
47
 Id. 
48
 Julius Genachowski, Comments on Open Internet, available at http://www.openinternet.gov. 
49
 But see the Madison River and Comcast investigations, discussed infra at text accompanying notes __ 
to __.   Net neutrality opponents typically dismiss such cases as aberrations that the Commission could, 
and did, handle through adjudication without the need for broad-reaching network neutrality rules. 
50
 See, e.g., Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, Comments of Verizon and 
Verizon Wireless, filed on January 14, 2010, at 12, available at www.fcc.gov (hereafter ―Verizon 
Comments‖). 
51
 See, e.g., Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An Institutional 
Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 19, 39 (2009) (summarizing 
net neutrality opponents‘ position). 
52
 See id.; see also Verizon Comments, supra note 50, at 21-31. 
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unaffiliated content providers have not assumed and upon which the 
broadband providers must earn a decent rate of return.  Comcast, Verizon, 
AT&T, and others invested this capital in part to augment their own ability 
to offer consumers bandwidth-intensive internet applications and content of 
their own, most notably enhanced video services.  Should consumer demand 
for bandwidth-consuming applications outstrip bandwidth supply (as 
occurred with dial-up), broadband providers argue that they should be able 
to grant priority access to the delivery of their own content, or to third-party 
providers willing to pay for priority access, so as to continue to recover the 
capital they have invested in their networks.
53
  Christopher Yoo also argues 
that allowing service providers to choose how to manage their bandwidth 
would encourage innovation in the ―onramp‖ market by making it 
economically viable for new experimental broadband business models to 
challenge existing broadband providers.
54
 
Before proceeding further, it is important to highlight the contours 
of the debate.  Net neutrality focuses upon the potential restrictions, if any, 
that broadband providers can put upon internet content and application 
providers, such as Google or Hulu.  It is not concerned with the fees that 
broadband providers charge end-user consumers for internet access.  All 
parties agree that broadband providers should be permitted to charge 
different prices to different end-user consumers, depending upon how much 
bandwidth the consumer uses or what speeds the consumer demands.  So 
while Chairman Genachowski has repeatedly referred to net neutrality as 
regulating the ―onramp to the Internet,‖ it is perhaps more accurate to 
describe it as regulating the Internet‘s ―offramp:‖ the focus is not the flow 
of information from the consumer to the Internet, but from the Internet to 
the consumer. 
In a sense, the ongoing debate about net neutrality is an argument 
about the continued vitality of the ―best efforts‖ internet to meet future 
consumer demand.  As Robert Atkinson and Philip Weiser explain, the 
Internet developed as an ―end-to-end‖ open architecture, within which a 
content or application provider could offer its goods to the public simply by 
placing a software program on a publicly available server.
55
  This wide-open 
Internet was, and is, comprised of ―best effort‖ networks, meaning 
―networks that deliver any and all digital content based upon the best guess 
and effort as to how to forward it along to its final destination.‖56  Content is 
broken into thousands of ―packets,‖ each of which are routed through 
                                               
53
 Christopher Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition? A 
Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 67 (2004). 
54
 Id. at 61 (―[A]llowing last-mile broadband providers to differentiate their product offerings can help 
prevent declining-cost industries from devolving into natural monopolies.‖). 
55
 Robert D. Atkinson & Philip J. Weiser, Information Tech. & Innovation Foundation, A “Third Way” 
on Network Neutrality (2006), available at http://www.itif.org/files/netneutrality.pdf 
56Id. at 4.  
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independent network paths to the end-user, whose computer reassembles 
them into the requested content.  The network provider—today‘s broadband 
access provider—makes no quality-of-service guarantee regarding how 
quickly particular content can be delivered, or even whether particular 
content will even arrive at its destination.   
As high-bandwidth applications proliferate across the web, it is 
unclear whether a ―best efforts‖ architecture remains the ideal model.  The 
―best efforts‖ internet evolved from a download model of data transmission: 
end users downloaded data from public servers in short, discrete bursts.  But 
more and more activity on today‘s Internet is much more interactive.57  
Applications such as two-way video communication or telemedicine
58
 
require real-time transmission of large amounts of data at high-speed and 
with low latency.
59
  Such applications require a minimum level of speed and 
performance that ―best efforts‖ networks do not guarantee.  Other 
applications, such as multichannel video service, still fit the download 
meme but must send a constant stream of bandwidth-consuming data to 
each end-user, consuming far more network capacity than earlier, more 
traditional download applications entail. 
When networks get congested, routers queue incoming data packets 
so they can proceed in an orderly fashion, and sometimes start dropping 
packets randomly to ease congestion.  With respect to email or webpage 
data, a delay in packet delivery or an occasional dropped packet is almost 
imperceptible to the end-user.  But similar delays with respect to streaming 
video or a two-way voice application could degrade the conversation 
sufficiently to render the application useless.   
In these cases, broadband providers make a reasonable argument for 
a ―managed network‖ which can identify certain types of data as more 
important than others, and give that data priority in the event of network 
congestion or some other factor rendering the simultaneous delivery of all 
requested content impossible.
60
  In essence, broadband providers envision a 
content delivery service similar to that of the U.S. Post Office: all content 
and application providers can use the network for ―first class‖ mail, but 
those companies who seek to purchase ―priority mail‖ or ―express mail‖ 
services could receive faster and higher-quality delivery.  This is known as 
―tiered access pricing.‖ 
                                               
57
 See Christopher Yoo, Comments at Innovation, Investment, and the Open Internet Workshop, January 
13 2010, available at http://blog.openinternet.gov/?p=255. 
58
 Telemedicine leverages broadband networks to allow medical care facilities to communicate remotely 
with physicians in a distant community to enhance the quality of medical care.  It is used most 
commonly to bring high-quality medical care to rural communities.  See, e.g., Mignon Clyburn, 
Broadband Adoption: Traveling the Consumers Last Mile, Prepared Remarks delivered at The Joint 
Center for Political and Economic Studies, Sept. 21, 2009, available at 2009 WL 3012591. 
59
 See Yoo, supra note 57.  Speed refers to the amount of time it takes a packet to travel from origin to 
destination.  Latency refers to the amount of packet loss that occurs while en route. 
60
 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 53, at 67; Verizon Comments, supra note 50, at 81-84. 
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On the other hand, allowing certain content providers to pay for 
high-speed access, while relegating non-payers to the network‘s ―slow 
lane,‖ would give an unfair advantage to well-capitalized, established 
companies in a medium that has historically rewarded innovation and 
entrepreneurship outside the mainstream.  In the words of Atkinson and 
Weiser, ―[u]nder the terms of the current debate, this development—of 
managed private Internet networks—is either an opportunity for new 
innovations or a threat to the Internet‘s open environment.  In reality, 
however, it is both.‖61 
 
E. Lurching Toward a Net Neutrality Policy 
 
This early debate spawned a series of proposed bills on net 
neutrality.  At one point in 2005 there were four separate net neutrality bills 
in some stage of the Capitol Hill process, which would have imposed 
varying levels of obligations on telecommunications network providers.
62
  
But the net neutrality debate turned out to be more smoke than fire: 
Congress has yet to pass legislation that would place any nondiscrimination 
obligations on broadband providers.  
This does not mean, however, that policymakers had turned a deaf 
ear to net neutrality concerns.  As part of the Commission‘s 2005 order 
reclassifying wireline broadband as a Title I service, the Commission issued 
a non-binding policy statement outlining what it viewed as the Four 
Freedoms governing its approach to the Internet.
63
  Specifically, the 
Commission stated the following: 
[T]o ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed, 
open, affordable, and accessible to all consumers, the 
Commission adopts the following principles: 
 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve 
and promote the open and interconnected nature of 
the public Internet, consumers are entitled to access 
the lawful Internet content of their choice. 
 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve 
and promote the open and interconnected nature of 
the public Internet, consumers are entitled to run 
                                               
61
 Id. at 4-5. 
62
 Several Congressional Committees discussed net neutrality, most notably the Senate Subcommittee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, where at a legislative mark-up session Chairman Ted Stevens 
famously stated that the Internet is ―not a big truck‖ but rather ―a series of tubes.‖  MP3 Recording: 
Hearing on S. 2686 Communications, Consumers' Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006 
Before the S. Commerce Comm. (June 8, 2006), available at http://media.publicknowledge.org/stevens-
on-nn.mp3.  Senator Stevens was widely ridiculed for these comments. 
63
 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Policy 
Statement, 20 FCC Rcd. 14986 (2005). 
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applications and use services of their choice, 
subject to the needs of law enforcement. 
 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve 
and promote the open and interconnected nature of 
the public Internet, consumers are entitled to 
connect their choice of legal devices that do not 
harm the network. 
 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve 
and promote the open and interconnected nature of 
the public Internet, consumers are entitled to 
competition among network providers, application 
and service providers, and content providers.
64
 
 
Notably, the Policy Statement also noted that these principles are ―are 
subject to reasonable network management‖ and are in any case not 
formally binding until they are adopted as part of a rulemaking 
proceeding.
65
  In a separate statement, then-Chairman Kevin Martin 
expressed his view that the increasing competition within the market for 
broadband providers rendered it unnecessary to promulgate formal, binding 
net neutrality rules.
66
 
The Commission‘s decision to issue its ―Four Freedoms‖ Policy 
Statement may have been influenced by its concurrent investigation of 
blocking allegations by Madison River Communications LLC, a small rural 
telephone and DSL provider.  Vonage, a provider of Voice-over-Internet-
Protocol (VoIP) service, complained that Madison River Communications 
was blocking ports that were typically used by Vonage customers to make 
VoIP telephone calls, presumably because VoIP service was competing 
directly against the company‘s traditional telephone service.67  Following a 
public uproar, Madison River agreed to a consent decree preventing it from 
blocking VoIP ports or otherwise prevent its customers from using VoIP 
applications.
68
  Although the Madison River order was not binding law, net 
neutrality advocates seized upon the order as evidence that their concerns 
were not unfounded. 
Momentum for net neutrality reform increased with the 
Commission‘s 2008 sanction of Comcast Corporation for unreasonable 
network management practices.
69
  Comcast experienced network congestion 
                                               
64
 Id. ¶ 4. 
65
 Id.  ¶ 4 n.15. 
66
 See Kevin J. Martin, Comments on Commission Policy Statement, August 5, 2005, available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260435A2.pdf.  
67
 See In re Madison River Communications and Affiliated Companies, Order, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295 (EB 
2005) 
68
 Id. 
69
 See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly 
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications; Broadband Industry Practices; Petition of Free Press et al. for 
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in certain neighborhoods caused by bandwidth-hogging peer-to-peer file 
sharing programs such as BitTorrent.  To solve this problem, Comcast 
secretly and selectively targeted packets stemming from such applications 
and delayed or terminated these transmissions by forging reset packets 
purporting to be from the requesting computer and requesting termination of 
the download.
70
  The Commission found that ―Comcast's practices 
contravene industry standards and have significantly impeded Internet users' 
ability to use applications and access content of their choice‖ in a manner 
that does not constitute ―reasonable network management.‖71  The 
Commission was particularly distressed by the company‘s deceitful 
behavior toward its end-user consumers, to whom it owed a duty of clear 
disclosure regarding the limitations it would impose upon the services they 
purchased.  The Commission therefore ordered Comcast to cease its 
practices and instead adopt a ―protocol-agnostic network management 
technique‖ with clear disclosure to consumers regarding its network 
management policies.
72
  The Comcast Order marked the first time that the 
Commission had enforced net neutrality-like principles against a broadband 
provider; Comcast has appealed the order to the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, where the matter is currently under submission.
73
 
 
F. The Commission’s Proposed Rules 
 
As the Comcast hearing played out, net neutrality became a hot 
issue in the 2008 presidential campaign, most notably in the Democratic 
primary.
74
  After the election, President Obama made good on his campaign 
promise to ―take the backseat to no one in [his] commitment to network 
neutrality.‖  He nominated noted network neutrality enthusiast Julius 
Genachowski as chairman of the Commission.  Shortly thereafter, the 
Commission promulgated a notice of proposed rulemaking that would, for 
                                                                                                             
Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement 
and Does Not Meet an Exception for ―Reasonable Network Management,‖ Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028 (2008) (hereafter ―Comcast Order‖). 
70
 Id. ¶¶ 6-8. 
71
 Id. ¶ 51. 
72
 Id. ¶ 54. 
73
 See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir., argued and submitted Jan 8, 2010).  Comcast has 
challenged the order on the basis that the Commission cannot enforce a non-binding policy statement 
without fair notice, and that the Commission lacks authority under Title I of the Communications Act to 
punish Comcast‘s conduct.  Other commentators have similarly argued that the Commission lacks 
authority to enforce its chosen rule against Comcast, while not defending Comcast‘s specific conduct 
and noting that Comcast could face liability under more general consumer protection statutes.  
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candidates co-sponsoring legislation that would have adopted strong restrictions on broadband 
providers‘ ability to engage in access-tiering.  See Nuechterlein, supra note 36, at 20 n.2. 
  
 15 
the first time, create binding net neutrality rules.  These proposed rules are 
currently pending before the agency in a matter entitled ―Preserving the 
Open Internet.‖75 
First, the Commission proposes to codify the Four Freedoms listed 
in the non-binding 2005 policy statement as binding rules of network 
management.
76
  But rather than codify them as freedoms to which 
consumers are entitled, the proposed rules would codify the restrictions as 
obligations on broadband providers.
77
  Therefore subject to ―reasonable 
network management,‖ a broadband service provider may not ―prevent any 
of its users from [(1)] sending or receiving the lawful content of the user‘s 
choice over the Internet...[(2)] running the lawful applications of or using 
the lawful services of the user‘s choice…[(3)] connecting to and using on its 
network the user‘s choice of lawful devices that do not harm the network.‖78  
It also cannot ―[(4)] deprive any of its users of the user‘s entitlement to 
competition among network providers, application providers, service 
providers, and content providers.‖79  The Commission states that 
codification of these existing principles would ―support our goals of 
protecting consumers and encouraging innovation and investment‖ over the 
Internet.
80
 
The Commission has also proposed two additional rules that were 
not included in the original Four Freedoms policy statement.  The fifth rule 
states that, ―[s]ubject to reasonable network management, a broadband 
Internet access service must treat lawful content, applications, and services 
in a nondiscriminatory manner.‖81  Notably, this proposed rule shifts the 
debate away from the obligations that broadband providers would owe to 
their paying end-user customers, which had been the focus of the Four 
Freedoms statement and spawned the most vitriolic portions of the Comcast 
Order.  The Commission made clear that this fifth principle ―would not 
prevent a broadband Internet access service provider from charging 
subscribers different prices for different services‖ or for tiered service at 
different speeds.
82
  Rather, the nondiscrimination rule would prevent 
broadband providers from denying access to third-party content and 
application providers attempting to send material to the broadband 
provider‘s end user.  They also would be unable to charge such providers 
                                               
75
 See Net Neutrality NOPR, supra note 1. 
76
 Id.  ¶¶ 88-102. 
77
 The proposed rules would apply to broadband network providers such as Verizon, Comcast, and others 
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78
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 Id. ¶ 104. 
82
 Id. ¶ 106. 
  
 16 
for ―enhanced or prioritized delivery to [the] end user‖ over the broadband 
network.
83
   
Finally, the Commission has proposed a sixth principle of 
―transparency‖ requiring that broadband providers ―disclose such 
information concerning network management and other practices as is 
reasonably required for users and content, application, and service providers 
to enjoy the protections specified in this part.‖84  The Commission explicitly 
stated that this rule stems directly from its experiences with Comcast‘s 
refusal to disclose its practices to consumers (and to the Commission) 
during the BitTorrent investigation.
85
 
But the proposed rules come with two large caveats that go far to 
determine the scope of the proposed obligations.  First, each of the six rules 
is subject to ―reasonable network management.‖86  The Commission has 
refused to define this carveback with specificity, preferring instead to 
―describe these concepts at a relatively general level and leave more 
detailed rulings to the adjudications of particular cases.‖87  But it proposes 
that broadband providers generally be permitted to ―reduce or mitigate the 
effects of congestion,‖ ―address quality-of-service concerns,‖ and ―prevent 
the unlawful transfer of content‖ or ―transfer of unlawful content.‖88  Of 
course, Comcast argued that its throttling of BitTorrent traffic was 
necessary to ―reduce or mitigate the effects of congestion,‖ yet the 
Commission rejected this argument.  The Commission‘s comments suggest 
that this carveback should be narrow, and that the ―reasonableness‖ of a 
particular network management practice likely turns upon whether it is 
narrowly tailored to support the Commission‘s nondiscrimination rule as 
closely as possible.  For example, the Commission has rejected the blocking 
or degrading of VoIP traffic to relieve congestion, unless the broadband 
provider puts the same restrictions on all other services that similarly affect 
bandwidth usage and have similar quality-of-service requirements.
89
  It has 
also rejected the singling out of any particular content provider‘s traffic for 
blocking or deprioritization, absent some evidence that this particular 
provider‘s traffic was harmful or illegal.90 
Second, the Commission has floated the possibility of an exception 
for ―managed or specialized services‖ that are provided over the same 
networks as broadband access but do not traverse the public internet.
91
  The 
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 Id. 
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Commission cites as possible examples telemedicine, public safety 
communications, distance learning, and—importantly—AT&T‘s U-verse 
Internet Protocol Television service.
92
  The proposed rules recognize that 
these speed- and latency-sensitive applications benefit from minimum 
performance guarantees that the ―best efforts‖ internet cannot deliver.  At 
the same time, however, it is concerned that granting such exceptions, either 
by rule or by case-by-case adjudication, could lead such services to 
―supplant or otherwise negatively affect the open Internet.‖93  The 
Commission thus invited comment on this trial balloon, without providing 
much guidance regarding what the final scope of this exception may be, if 
any. 
With the Open Internet NOPR, the Commission has for the first 
time considered imposing the binding restrictions that net neutrality 
proponents have long sought: real, binding limits on the ability of 
broadband providers to grant or deny third parties the right to access their 
networks, and on what terms.  Of course, antitrust law already constrains 
broadband providers‘ ability to leverage their control of networks to harm 
competitors or otherwise seek an unfair advantage in other markets, just as 
it does most other commercial enterprises.
94
  But otherwise, the 
Commission has stated repeatedly that broadband access is not subject to 
common carrier regulations, notably the requirement to provide 
nondiscriminatory service to all comers at just and reasonable rates.  Thus 
broadband providers remain largely free to determine which entities can use 
their facilities and the terms of such use, just as any other property owner 
can determine the conditions of use of its property.  While competitive 
pressure and present network capacities have led broadband providers 
largely to refrain from exercising this right of ownership, the ability to do so 
provided some level of comfort as Comcast, Verizon, and AT&T spent 
billions of dollars upgrading to fiber-optic cable.  This investment would be 
recovered in part by the sale of advanced services such as multichannel 
video distribution.  As demand for bandwidth grows, the ability to move or 
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exclude unaffiliated content helps assure that broadband providers can 
continue to provide those advanced services to their end-user customers.
95
 
The ―Open Internet‖ framework therefore severely constricts the 
bundle of property rights that comes with ownership of a broadband 
network.  By denying broadband providers the right to exclude virtual 
trespassers from their networks, the proposed rules effectively grant 
application and content providers unfettered access to the physical wires 
that comprise the network.  Were this a physical easement across network 
providers‘ property, the Supreme Court‘s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence 
would find little difficulty labeling this easement a permanent physical 
occupation of property by another, and thus a per se taking that requires 
compensation.  There is no reason why the same principles should not apply 
to compelled access to broadband providers‘ physical networks.  At the very 
least, the scheme interferes with broadband providers‘ reasonable 
investment-backed expectations and therefore warrants compensation as a 
regulatory taking.  To explain why, one must examine the Court‘s modern 
takings jurisprudence and how it applies to electronic networks, a topic to 
which this paper now turns. 
 
II. NET NEUTRALITY THROUGH THE LENS OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 
 
A. Overview of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence 
 
The Fifth Amendment concludes with the pithy restriction, ―nor 
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.‖96  
The clause imposes both a substantive and a procedural hurdle on the 
federal government‘s eminent domain power: the government can take 
private property only if the taking is for a ―public use‖ and when it does so, 
it must provide ―just compensation‖ to the affected landowner.97  For the 
past 85 years, the clause has also been interpreted to place a limit on the 
government‘s power to regulate private property.  A particular regulation on 
the use of private property may well be within Congress‘s power to adopt, 
but if the regulation goes ―too far‖ it will effectively constitute a taking that 
requires just compensation, even if title to the property is technically left in 
the owner‘s hands.98 
The Court has struggled to determine when a regulation can go ―too 
far.‖  For over three decades, Penn Central has provided the three rough 
guideposts of regulatory takings jurisprudence.
99
  Under this test, the Court 
balances (1) the economic impact of the regulation and (2) its interference 
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with the owner‘s reasonable investment-backed expectations against (3) the 
nature of the government‘s action.100  Penn Central is, by its terms, an ad-
hoc balancing test, which offers a rough list of issues that a court should 
consider in its takings calculus but deliberately refuses to determine how 
much weight each factor should receive.
101
  The resulting framework is 
flexible enough to be adapted to a wide range of potential regulations 
promulgated by the modern administrative state, but offers maddingly little 
predictability or consistency across cases.
102
 
To provide some modicum of certainty, subsequent caselaw has 
identified a handful of categories of regulations that constitute per se 
takings without the need to balance the three Penn Central factors.  One of 
these is the permanent physical invasion doctrine.  In Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
103
 the Court announced that ―a 
permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking 
without regard to the public interests that it may serve.‖104  Loretto involved 
a New York statute requiring all landlords to allow cable companies access 
to their properties to provide cable services to tenants, without charging 
more than a nominal fee for access.
105
  In Loretto‘s case, this statute allowed 
the cable company to install a small metal box on the rooftop of the building 
and a narrow cable down the front of the building to the first floor.
106
  The 
Court held that because the statute permitted the cable company to 
permanently occupy the rooftop and the side of the building without the 
consent of the property owner, it constituted a permanent physical 
occupation of the landlord‘s property and therefore the Fifth Amendment 
required that just compensation be paid.
107
 
While most commentators treat per se takings as doctrine distinct 
from the Penn Central balancing test,
108
 the Loretto Court saw its rule as a 
specific application of the more general rule.  Loretto draws upon Penn 
Central‘s suggestion that ―[a] taking may more readily be found when the 
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by 
government‖ rather than merely an exercise of the state‘s traditional police 
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power.
109
  In essence, Loretto held that where that physical invasion rises to 
the level of a permanent physical occupation of property (by the 
government or by a third party), the third prong of the balancing test weighs 
conclusively in the owner‘s favor without a need to consider the other two 
factors.  ―[A] permanent physical occupation is a government action of such 
a unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that a 
court might ordinarily examine. …In such a case, ‗the character of the 
government action‘ not only is an important factor in resolving whether the 
action works a taking but also is determinative.‖110 
Loretto singled out government-sanctioned permanent physical 
invasions both under the Court‘s prior case law and as a matter of first 
principles.  Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall explained that ―[s]uch an 
appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner‘s 
property interests‖ because it ―does not simply take a single strand from the 
bundle of property rights‖ but rather ―chops through the bundle, taking a 
slice of every strand.‖111  Moreover, Justice Marshall explained, an owner 
suffers a ―special kind of injury‖ from a permanent physical occupation.  At 
a bare minimum, property law guarantees that an owner will remain 
relatively undisturbed in possession of his or her property.  A regulation that 
not only ousts the owner from possession, but permits a stranger to invade 
and act as the true owner ―literally adds insult to injury.‖112  Notably, Justice 
Marshall was not generally known as a proponent of either strong individual 
property rights or bright-line rules; his authorship of Loretto and his 
justification of the decision from first principles provide significant support 
for the Court‘s per se rule. 
Loretto thus draws a constitutional distinction between compelled 
physical occupation cases and more run-of-the-mill exercises of the state‘s 
police power.  Loretto takings go beyond mere ―restrictions upon the 
owner’s use of his property‖;113 rather, as William Barr, Henry Weissmann, 
and John Frantz note, ―[t]he operative fact in such cases is that the 
government is appropriating the use of the property for the benefit of the 
public.‖114  Loretto thus fits comfortably alongside the long line of so-called 
―utility takings‖ cases, which hold that the appropriation of private property 
for public use requires just compensation.
115
  When the government 
eliminates the owner‘s right to exclude, the property in question ceases to be 
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wholly private.  While the state is free to appropriate the use of property in 
this fashion, the Constitution requires that compensation be paid.
116
 
 
B. Net Neutrality as a Per Se Taking Under Loretto 
 
1. Net Neutrality Effects a Permanent Physical Occupation of  
Broadband Networks 
Even the most straightforward telecommunications regulations can 
be a study in opaque, jargon-laden decisionmaking.  But once stripped of its 
technical façade and reduced to more conventional property terms, the 
proposed net neutrality regulations strongly suggest a permanent physical 
occupation of broadband providers‘ property under Loretto.  The purpose of 
the ―open internet‖ initiative is to prevent broadband providers from 
controlling which third-party content and application providers can use their 
networks to deliver information to end-user consumers.  In essence, these 
third parties receive an unlimited, continuous right of access to broadband 
providers‘ private property.  This access allows them to physically invade 
broadband networks with their electronic signals and permanently occupy 
portions of network capacity, all without having to pay the network provider 
for access.  The effect is to appropriate the use of these private networks for 
the public‘s benefit, in the form of unfettered and nondiscriminatory access 
to the content and applications of the consumer‘s choosing.  As Judge 
Stephen Williams noted in a different (but related) telecommunications 
takings case, ―[t]he creation of an entitlement in some parties to use the 
facilities of another, gratis, would seem on its face to implicate Loretto.‖117 
To draw a parallel to real property law, the rights granted to content 
and application providers are akin to a virtual easement to transverse 
broadband providers‘ networks.  This type of access right fits comfortably 
within the Court‘s physical takings cases.  Loretto quotes approvingly 
Professor Frank Michelman‘s analysis showing that, while regulatory 
takings cases are hard to classify with certainty, ―[t]he one incontestable 
case for compensation (short of formal expropriation) seems to occur with 
the government deliberately brings it about that its agents, or the public at 
large, ‗regularly‘ use, or ‗permanently‘ occupy, space or a thing which 
theretofore was understood to be under private ownership.‖118  In Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission,
119
 decided four years after Loretto, the 
Court struggled with the creation of an easement across a privately-held 
beach, which would allow members of the public to cross from one public 
beach to another.  The Court made clear that, were such an easement to be 
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directly imposed upon the property owner, it would unquestionably 
constitute a Loretto taking, even though it meant that different members of 
the public might occupy different parts of the property at any given time. 
―‗[P]ermanent physical occupation‘ has occurred, for purposes of that rule, 
where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and 
fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no 
particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the 
premises.‖120 
Thus the net neutrality rules are not mere restrictions on an owner‘s 
ability to use its property, but instead implicate the full bundle of rights 
whose intersection so troubled Justice Marshall and the Loretto Court. In 
Tahoe-Sierra, the Court explained that most regulations do not effect a per 
se taking claim because they ―do[] not give the government any right to use 
the property, nor do[ they] dispossess the owner or affect her right to 
exclude others.‖121  Net neutrality, by contrast, implicates each of these 
rights: like the cable access statute at issue in Loretto, the proposed 
regulation ―chops through the bundle‖ of property rights, ―taking a slice of 
every strand.‖122 
Most obviously, broadband providers lose the right to exclude, 
which ―has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands 
in an owner's bundle of property rights.‖123  Indeed, the very purpose of net 
neutrality is to deny broadband providers the right to exclude others from 
their networks.  As the Court has explained, ―required acquiescence is at the 
heart of the concept of occupation.‖124  Unless they exit the internet access 
business, broadband providers must allow any and all content and 
application providers to traverse their networks, and cannot charge a fee for 
doing so.  In the Court‘s parlance, the rule converts content and application 
providers from mere ―commercial licensee[s]‖ into ―interloper[s] with a 
government license.‖125   
By surrendering permanent access to third parties, broadband 
providers also lose the ability to control the use of their networks.  At a base 
level, a broadband provider physically cannot use for its own purposes 
bandwidth that has already been occupied by a third party.  Nor may it 
sends its own signals through the network if doing so will 
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disproportionately ―degrade‖ third party content (for example, by adversely 
rerouting third-party data packets in a way that would cause delays or 
packet loss).  Indeed, broadband providers even lose the ability to control 
how third parties use the network, insofar as the rules prohibit providers 
from prioritizing certain third-party packets for faster delivery.  As Barr, 
Weissmann, and Frantz summarize, the government has appropriated the 
right to use broadband networks, so that all content and application 
providers can peddle their wares to consumers.  In Loretto terms, broadband 
providers ―not only cannot exclude others, but can make no nonpossessory 
use of the property.‖126   
Finally, net neutrality infringes on the right to dispose.  Again 
quoting Loretto, ―even though the owner may retain the bare legal right to 
dispose of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the permanent occupation 
of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the right of any value, since 
the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the property.‖  The 
prohibition against charging for preferred network access limits network 
providers‘ ability to ―lease‖ scarce broadband for a profit, and also limits 
the value of the network to prospective buyers insofar as they are unable to 
use for their own purposes that portion fo the network occupied by third-
party content.
127
  
 
2. Fifth Amendment Protection of Electronic Networks 
 
Nor should it be relevant that the right of access at issue is a right to 
access electronic networks rather than to real property.  As an initial matter, 
the Loretto rule has never been limited to physical occupation of real 
property.  The D.C. Circuit has addressed this issue at length in Nixon v. 
United States, a case involving a per se taking of President Nixon‘s private 
papers by national archives.
128
  The court held that ―[o]ne may be just as 
permanently and completely dispossessed of personal property as of real 
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property‖ and noting that the Court has repeatedly noted in dicta that per se 
physical taking of personal property is possible.
129
   
Indeed, the Loretto Court itself considered the possibility that its 
rule could cover access to electronic networks.  As Justice Blackmun‘s 
dissent explains, Loretto‘s attorney explained at oral argument that it should 
not matter whether the cable line in question was owned by the cable 
company or the landlord, because the cable company‘s invasion of the line 
by electronic signals would still constitute a permanent physical occupation 
of private property.
130
  Justice Blackmun agreed that the majority‘s opinion, 
when ―[l]iterally read,‖ must include compelled access to electronic 
networks:  ―[s]o long as Teleprompter continuously passed its electronic 
signal through the cable…a ‗physical touching‘ by a stranger was satisfied 
and that § 828 therefore worked a taking.‖131   
In the network access context, the Eleventh Circuit has found that a 
statute requiring utility companies to allow cable companies to attach wires 
to their network of utility poles constitutes a per se physical taking of utility 
property.
132
  Admittedly, the physical configurations of the two takings are 
different:  pole attachment involves wires occupying space on a network of 
poles, while net neutrality involves data streams occupying space inside a 
network of wires.  But the legal issues are identical.  Both laws require 
network owners to dedicate a portion of available capacity to third-party use 
for the purpose of enhancing the telecommunications industry. 
Moreover, as a factual matter, the transmission of content over 
broadband networks is not some metaphysical act.
133
  It takes place in a real 
physical space, the fiber-optic and copper wires that comprise the 
broadband network, which are mounted in above-ground or underground 
easements across real property.  Transmission of internet content primarily 
involves the movement of electrons, which are physical particles, that 
occupy rivalrous limited space on those lines en route from the Internet to 
the end-user consumer.  While the electrons are invisible to the naked eye 
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and travel very quickly within a sheathed wire, the physical act of 
transmission is nothing more than a microscopic version of vehicles 
traveling along a highway—or pedestrians traversing an easement.134 
Some courts have suggested that physical takings doctrine should 
apply to electronic networks, in the context of cable must-carry rules.  The 
1992 Cable Act gave certain broadcasters the right to compel cable 
companies to carry their stations on cable networks.
135
  The cable industry 
fought an unsuccessful battle to oppose the requirement, primarily on First 
Amendment grounds.
136
  Along the way, however, the judiciary hinted that 
a Fifth Amendment claim might have gained some traction.  Dissenting 
from the three-judge panel that denied the cable industry‘s challenge, Judge 
Stephen Williams explained that a law creating an ―entitlement in some 
parties to use the facilities of another‖ seems to invite a challenge under 
Loretto.  In the process, he swept aside the broadcast industry‘s 
counterargument that Loretto should be ―limited to ‗physical‘ occupations 
of ‗real property.‘‖137  Later in Turner I, four Justices recognized that a 
common carriage obligation placed on some of a cable system‘s channels 
would raise a Takings Clause questions even though the question was not 
squarely presented before that Court.
138
 
Laurence Tribe expanded upon this theme eight years later, when 
arguing against a proposal that cable companies be forced to carry digital 
broadcast signals.
 139
  The shift from analog to digital television meant that 
broadcasters could now send multiple video feeds instead of just one signal 
over the same amount of bandwidth.  The FCC opened a proceeding in 2002 
to consider whether cable companies should be required to carry these 
digital feeds on their systems, as the 1992 Cable Act required for analog 
feeds.  Tribe argued that by forcing cable companies to allow broadcasters 
exclusive use of channels on the cable system, the FCC would deprive those 
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cable companies of the right to exclude and would effectively condemn a 
portion of the cable network under Loretto.
140
 
Notably, Tribe argued that ―[t]here would be no question that a 
compensable taking of private property for public use had occurred if the 
government decreed that cable operators had to turn over their entire 
channel capacity to broadcasters, even if cable companies kept bare 
possession of the tangible real and personal property necessary to provide 
programming to the system‘s subscribers over those channels.‖141  The 
constitutional principle is the same, he argued, ―whether the transfer is 
accomplished wholesale or piece by piece. There is no constitutional 
exception that allows the government to avoid the Takings Clause by taking 
one strand of property at a time.‖142   
But Tribe‘s parade-of-horribles hypothetical almost precisely states 
the Commission‘s plans with respect to net neutrality.  The proposed rules 
could effectively turn over the entire capacity of the broadband network to 
content and application providers, if demand for third-party content 
outstripped available bandwidth.  Broadband providers would retain bare 
possession of their network facilities, but would be able to use those 
facilities to transmit content only as bandwidth permits.  Moreover, their use 
of their own network would be subject to duties not to interfere with 
consumer choice and not to block or degrade other content and 
applications—which puts them at a disadvantage in the market for content 
and applications, since their competitors would labor under no such 
restrictions.  In Tribe‘s words, there should be ―no question‖ that a 
compensable taking of private property for public use has occurred. 
 
3. The Cablevision Decision 
 
Yet some courts have rejected the extension of the physical takings 
doctrine to the context of occupation of electronic networks.  In mid-2009, 
Cablevision raised a belated Takings Clause challenge to the analog must-
carry statute adjudicated in the Turner cases, in the context of an FCC order 
requiring it to carry a Long Island station on its networks.
143
  This argument 
had previously garnered some support from FCC Commissioner Harold 
Furchtgott-Roth: ―It is not unreasonable to argue that when a broadcast 
station's signal is mandatorily carried over a cable system, that carriage 
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constitutes a permanent, physical occupation of the cable operator's private 
property - and thus a per se taking of that property… Here, the agency's 
decision to avoid any substantive discussion of Cablevision's Takings claim 
pays silent tribute to the strength of the claim.‖144  Yet the Second Circuit 
rejected Cablevision‘s argument, holding tersely that must-carry does not 
require any installation of broadcasting equipment on Cablevision‘s 
facilities and that the transmission of data over cable bandwidth does not 
involve a physical occupation of Cablevision property under Loretto.
145
 
The Cablevision decision demonstrates the uncertainty surrounding 
the extension of ―terrestrial‖ concepts to electronic networks.  The above 
discussion shows that a significant argument can be made that the Fifth 
Amendment protects electronic networks from permanent physical 
occupation, just as various other forms of property are protected.  But the 
abstract sense that networks are somehow ―different‖ and that different 
rules should apply can constrain the court‘s analysis and lead to the type of 
ipse dixit conclusions found in Cablevision.  In reality, broadband wires are 
not black boxes beyond the reach of constitutional protection, and data 
transmission is not an indecipherable metaphysical process.  While Loretto 
undoubtedly described its ruling as ―narrow‖, later courts have extended its 
holding to reach easements across real property, attachment to utility poles, 
and possession of purely personal property.  Other doctrines have long 
found virtual access to networks a constitutional concern and have adapted 
―real-world‖ doctrines to fit network access issues.146  Broadband providers 
have the same property rights in their networks as other owners have in 
more conventional property, and should receive the same level of protection 
from permanent physical occupation under the Fifth Amendment.  
 
C. Net Neutrality as a Regulatory Taking Under Penn Central 
 
Cablevision correctly notes that a regulatory takings claim that does 
not satisfy the Loretto test or another of the court‘s per se takings doctrines 
is typically subjected to the Penn Central ad-hoc balancing test mentioned 
above.
147
  If broadband providers were to lose their claim that net neutrality 
effects a Loretto taking, they may nonetheless assert a claim under Penn 
                                               
144
 In re WXTC License Partnership G.P., 15 FCC Rcd. 3308, 3320 (2000) (separate statement of 
Comm‘r Furchtgott-Roth).  
145
 Cablevision, 570 F.3d at 98; see also Qwest Corp. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 672 (Fed. Cl. 2001) 
(denying Loretto claim stemming from statute mandating that local telephone company grant competitor 
access to its telephone network facilities).  
146
 See, e.g., Turner II, 520 U.S. at 180 (adopting modified O’Brien test under First Amendment to 
determine constitutionality of compelled speech over cable networks); Katz v United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967) (Fourth Amendment does not turn on whether government physically penetrated area 
occupied by petitioner; highlights petitioner‘s expectation of privacy and norm that telephone is medium 
of private communication); Omnibus Safe Streets Act (regulating wiretapping). 
147
 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see text accompanying 
notes __-__. 
  
 28 
Central.  As discussed above, this ad-hoc test balances three factors: the 
owner‘s reasonable investment-backed expectations, the economic impact 
of the regulation, and the nature of the government‘s action.  Regulations 
that merely ―adjust[] the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote 
the common good‖ are likely to be upheld.  Moreover, because 
―[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in 
the general law,‖148 the doctrine typically gives wide latitude to regulators 
seeking only to regulate one‘s use of property.  But a taking ―may more 
readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as 
a physical invasion by government,‖ even if short of the Loretto per se 
standard, particularly where the economic impact and interference with 
investment-backed expectations are great.
149
 
 
1. Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations 
 
Broadband providers are likely to assert that net neutrality unduly 
interferes with their reasonable investment-backed expectations with regard 
to future broadband service.  As noted in Section IC, the Commission ended 
the Open Access debate by labeling broadband service as a Title I 
information service free of nondiscrimination and other common carrier 
obligations that accompany more heavily regulated telecommunications 
services.  The end of this regulatory uncertainty led to an explosion in 
investment in fiber-optic cable and other network improvements, investment 
that providers hoped to recover through not only the sale of faster internet 
service, but also enhanced services such as video service that faster 
broadband speeds made possible.  Net neutrality unreasonably interferes 
with these expectations of future revenue streams—expectations backed by 
literally billions of dollars of infrastructure investment.  Broadband 
providers have a vested interest in their ability to block or degrade content 
and applications to shield their present and future enhanced services from 
broadband congestion.  Interference with these expectations, they would 
argue, should weigh heavily in their favor in the Penn Central calculus.   
While this argument is strong—the billions invested in 
infrastructure and the guarantees proffered by Brand X and Commission 
precedent set broadband providers apart from most claims of investment-
backed expectations—broadband providers face a significant hurdle.  As 
many have noted, ―[d]oing business in a highly regulated field raises the 
bar‖ for showing that any investment-backed expectations were 
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reasonable.
150
  As the Supreme Court has explained, ―those who do business 
in [a] regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by 
subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end.‖151 
Although broadband service is only lightly regulated under Title I 
of the Communications Act, broadband providers are primarily either 
telephone companies subject to Title II or cable providers subject to Title VI 
(or both), and are therefore readily familiar with the realities of doing 
business as a regulated industry.  Moreover, broadband providers have been 
on notice for years of the possibility of being subjected to future net 
neutrality regulation: not only have a flurry of proposals reached 
committees in Congress, but the Commission explicitly issued its Four 
Freedoms policy statement in 2005.  While the policy statement was non-
binding, its unanimous approval and explicit language regarding future 
rulemaking proceedings suggested strongly that some form of net neutrality 
lay in the industry‘s future.  The Comcast order and the Obama campaign‘s 
net neutrality platform dispelled any lingering doubts as to the ultimate 
destination of internet policy.  Therefore while fiber upgrades were 
implemented at a time of relatively light regulation, any expectation by 
shareholders that internet access would remain unregulated for the 
foreseeable future would have been unreasonable, or at least a judge could 
reasonably so find. 
 
2. Economic Impact 
 
While the investment-backed expectations inquiry examines the 
loss of future earning potential, the economic impact prong asks the court to 
examine the effect of the regulation on the present value of the property.  
Economic impact is rarely dispositive—the Court famously sustained 
zoning ordinances against a takings challenge despite the fact that the 
regulation caused a 75% reduction in property value
152—a greater showing 
of economic impact can lead to a lesser showing on the other two factors. 
In this case, it is difficult to determine ex ante what the economic 
impact of net neutrality will be on broadband providers‘ current use.  
Broadband providers are not currently engaged in blocking, traffic 
throttling, and other behavior that the net neutrality rules would forbid.  
Nor, for the most part, are they offering tiered service to content and 
application providers willing to pay for quality of service guarantees.  The 
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lack of such behavior suggests that the ability to engage in such practices is 
not essential to maintenance of present operations.   
One can question whether the Supreme Court has charted the 
correct course in choosing to ignore the regulation‘s effect on potential 
future markets.  In copyright law, for example, owners can claim 
infringement based not only on lost sales in existing markets for the work at 
issue, but also based on interference with the rights holder‘s ability to 
exploit future markets that it has not yet entered.  But under existing Court 
precedent, the economic impact is small.  The net neutrality rules impose 
primarily opportunity costs, in the sense of the lost value of the option to 
engage in such behavior if necessary.  But the value of such an option is 
inherently speculative, and the loss of this option has little impact on the 
industry‘s current economics.  Therefore it is likely that this factor will not 
weigh strongly in the broadband providers‘ favor. 
 
3. Character of the Government Action 
 
This prong examines the motives behind the government‘s action 
and the extent to which it interferes with the owner‘s preexisting property 
rights.
153
  In this case, these factors tug in opposite directions.  The 
government is not merely ―acting in an enterprise capacity‖ for its own 
benefit.
154
  On the one hand, the Commission has promulgated these rules to 
benefit public welfare through assurances of an open internet.
155
  Rightly or 
not, the Commission recognizes broadband providers as bottlenecks in the 
broadband economy, and has determined that it is in the public interest to 
guard innovation and creativity from potential abuse of that bottleneck 
position.   
On the other hand, the government‘s chosen method of regulating in 
the public interest involves highly invasive inroads into the private property 
rights of network providers.  As noted above, the net neutrality rules 
substantially interfere with broadband providers‘ traditional rights to 
exclude from, use, and dispose of property.  The providers‘ takings claim is 
similar to the claim presented in Kaiser Aetna, where the government 
imposed a navigational servitude on a private marina in the public 
interest.
156
  The property owner purchased a private pond in Hawaii and, 
with the approval of the Army Corps of Engineers, dredged the pond and 
converted it into a marina.
157
  As a final step, the owner cut a channel to 
connect his marina to a nearby bay.  Once it did so, however, the 
government claimed that the marina constituted ―navigable waters‖ and 
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therefore imposed a navigational servitude on the marina to permit access to 
the public.
158
  The Court held that the government had authority to impose 
the servitude—the equivalent of an easement—on the property, but that 
doing so deprived the owner of the right to exclude.  For that taking, the 
Court awarded just compensation.
159
 
One can debate whether Kaiser Aetna is better classified as a 
Loretto case or a Penn Central case.  Loretto affirmatively disavows the 
placement of Kaiser Aetna within its per se rule: because the servitude is in 
the nature of the easement, the Court explained, people come and go as they 
please.  Thus while there is a physical invasion of the marina by the public 
generally, there is no permanent physical occupation.  Nollan, however, 
seems to eschew this logic, asserting unequivocally that the imposition of an 
easement on real property constitutes a per se taking, regardless of the fact 
that no individual user would maintain a permanent position on the 
easement. 
If, after Nollan, Kaiser Aetna is better classified as a Loretto case, 
then the parallels between this case and that one strengthens the broadband 
providers‘ per se physical appropriation claim.  If, however, Kaiser Aetna 
properly belongs with run-of-the-mill regulatory takings cases under Penn 
Central, then it helps weigh the ―nature of the government action‖ factor in 
the owners‘ favor by showing how significantly the regulation would invade 
private property interests.   
Given the ad-hoc nature of the Penn Central test, it is always 
difficult to predict with certainty how a court will determine any given 
regulatory takings case.  But given the lack of significant present economic 
impact and the seemingly strong public interest served by net neutrality 
regulation, broadband providers likely face an uphill battle to convince a 
judge that the rules constitute a typical regulatory taking.  The physical 
appropriation claim is the better of the two arguments broadband providers 
can make to try to preserve their property rights from Commission 
appropriation. 
 
D.  Distinguishing Common Carriage and Public Accommodations 
 
Proponents may argue that the proposed net neutrality rules are 
simply a particular species of common carriage or public accommodations 
laws, which generally withstand Fifth Amendment scrutiny.  The Court has 
explained that  
Where ―permanent physical occupation‖ of land is 
concerned, we have refused to allow the government to 
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decree it anew (without compensation), no matter how 
weighty the asserted ―public interests‖ involved-though we 
assuredly would permit the government to assert a 
permanent easement that was a pre-existing limitation upon 
the land owner's title. 
160
 
In other words, a regulatory takings claim would not lie if the restriction 
stems from background limits that the common law traditionally placed 
upon property.  In such a case, no taking can occur because the law has not 
―taken‖ anything from the landowner.  Rather, if the common law never 
recognized the right at issue, then it was never the owner‘s to begin with. 
But upon closer examination, this defense collapses.  To avail itself 
of this safe harbor, the Commission must show that ―the law or 
decree…do[es] no more than duplicate the result that could have been 
achieved in the courts‖ under a common law property claim, or otherwise 
make explicit a limitation implied in the owner‘s title by ―existing rules or 
understandings.‖161  In this case, the net neutrality restrictions go far beyond 
whatever limitations common carriage or public accommodations norms 
placed upon network owners at common law. 
 
1. Common Carriage 
 
Common carriage is a slippery term.  The Communications Act 
defines a ―common carrier‖ somewhat circularly as ―any person engaged as 
a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or 
radio.‖162  But perhaps more helpfully, it also notes that ―[a] 
telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this 
chapter only to the extent that it is engaged in providing 
telecommunications service.‖163  Since the Commission has classified 
broadband service as an ―information service‖ rather than a 
―telecommunications service,‖164 the Act precludes a finding that, as a 
matter of statute, an implied common carriage restriction lurks in the 
shadows of broadband providers‘ property rights.165 
The Commission fares no better with the common law.  In NARUC 
v. FCC, the DC Circuit struggled with the ―long and complicated history‖ of 
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the ―common law definition of common carrier,‖ as it would apply to the 
telecommunications industry.
166
  The NARUC court explained, 
Originally, the doctrine was used to impose a greater 
standard of care upon carriers who held themselves out as 
offering to serve the public in general. The rationale was 
that by holding themselves out to the public at large, 
otherwise private carriers took on a quasi-public character. 
This character, coupled with the lack of control exercised 
by shippers or travellers over the safety of their carriage, 
was seen to justify imposing upon the carrier the status of 
an insurer.
167
 
By the late nineteenth century, common carriers found themselves subject to 
rate and service regulations in addition to a heightened standard of care.  In 
the 1876 decision Munn v. Illinois, the Court sustained such restrictions 
placed upon a grain elevator against a challenge that they effected a 
deprivation of property without due process.
168
  The Court found that such 
restrictions were appropriate when the business in question is ―affected by 
the public interest,‖ a phrase coined two centuries before by Sir Matthew 
Hale, then-Lord Chief Justice of the King‘s Bench.169  Munn discussed at 
length the types of industries that Hale classified in this category, such as 
ferries,
170
 wharves,
171
 and warehouses.
172
  In each case, Lord Hale described 
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the industry in question as either operating pursuant to a franchise or charter 
from the king, or otherwise possessing monopoly power over the public.  In 
such cases, Munn explained, private property is dedicated to a public use to 
such a degree as to justify public regulation. 
The NARUC court pulled these and other strands of common law 
common carriage into a two-part test.  As interpreted by subsequent courts 
and Commission decisions, this test finds a business to be a common carrier 
―[(1)] if it will ‗make capacity available to the public indifferently‘ or [(2)] 
if ‗the public interest requires common carrier operation of the proposed 
facility.‘‖173  The first prong focuses upon whether the business ―undertakes 
to carry for all people indiscriminately….  [A] carrier will not be a common 
carrier where its practice is to make individualized decisions, in particular 
cases, whether and on what terms to deal.‖174  The second focuses primarily 
upon market dominance: ―In ascertaining the public interest, the focus of 
our inquiry here is whether the license applicant has sufficient market power 
to warrant regulatory treatment as a common carrier.‖175  This disjunctive 
test thus captures the broad range of industries traditionally considered 
common carriers: utilities such as electricity and traditional telephony are 
common carriers by virtue of their market power, while industries such as 
trucking and lodging become common carriers despite market power due to 
the voluntary decision to hold themselves out to serve the public 
indiscriminately. 
Broadband providers satisfy neither prong of the disjunctive 
NARUC test.  First, as regards content and application providers, broadband 
providers explicitly have not held themselves out to carry for all entities 
indiscriminately.  Rather, they reserved the right to make, and in many cases 
actually have made, ―individual decisions, in particular cases, whether and 
on what terms to deal.‖  Indeed, Verizon, AT&T and the rest of the industry 
have opposed the Open Internet initiative precisely because it would deny 
them the ability to negotiate individualized access agreements that they 
wish to reach with content and application providers.  And the Commission 
has repeatedly found that the marketplace for broadband services is 
competitive, thus foreclosing a finding of market power.  Indeed, this 
finding was central to the Commission‘s decision to classify broadband as a 
Title I service free of the common carrier obligations that would have come 
had it instead been classified as a Title II telecommunications service.
176
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Because broadband service does not satisfy either prong of the NARUC test, 
it does not fit the traditional common law definition of common carriage. 
Susan Crawford has recently suggested that this focus on market 
power represents a flawed interpretation of past precedent.
177
  She argues 
that market power is only a recent yardstick for common carriage and is at 
odds with the history of common carriage legislation.
178
  Crawford would 
substitute in its place a more amorphous test that focuses upon whether the 
industry in question has a ―special relationship‖ with the state, in the sense 
that their services are ―fundamental to a successful polity.‖179  But this 
proposed definition provides little more clarity than Lord Hale‘s original 
formulation.  As Crawford candidly notes, it is difficult to determine what 
the ―principled basis‖ for this special relationship is, in a way that would 
distinguish common carriers from providers of other basic societal staples 
such as ―flour or salt.‖180  Moreover, this formulation downplays the 
obvious fact that concerns about market power have historically animated 
many decisions in this area, from Munn forward.  The Communications Act 
is itself modeled upon the Interstate Commerce Act, which imposed 
common carrier duties on railroads explicitly because of concerns about 
market power.  And while some traditional common carriers do not 
historically possess market power—such as trucking or aeronautics—the 
NARUC test explains that they became common carriers by virtue of a 
strategic decision to serve the public indiscriminately.  Absent this 
voluntary act, the common law imposed common carrier-like obligations 
only to control market power, and that rationale is simply not present in the 
modern broadband industry.   
Even if Crawford was correct, however, and broadband does 
resemble the type of industry traditionally classified as a common carrier, 
the proposed net neutrality regulations would fail because they impose a 
burden on the industry far greater than traditional common carriage would.   
Traditional common carriage regulations would impose, at most, rate 
regulations and nondiscrimination obligations on broadband providers: the 
essence of common carriage is to provide service to all comers at just and 
reasonable rates.
181
  Under this formula, broadband providers would be able 
to provide ―tiered‖ service to content and application providers for a fee, as 
the U.S. Postal Service does to its customers, as long as they offer similar 
service tiers at similar rates to similarly-situated providers.  But the Open 
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Internet initiative, by contrast, would ban such agreements outright, whether 
or not this service is provided on a common carriage basis.
182
 
None of this is to suggest that Congress is without the power to 
impose common carriage-like restrictions on broadband providers as a 
matter of policy.  As noted above, Congress retains the power to place 
whatever restrictions on broadband providers that it deems in the public 
interest.  But the Commission‘s proposed initiative cannot be insulated from 
the Fifth Amendment with reference to traditional common carriage 
principles.  Broadband providers simply do not fit the profile of a traditional 
common carrier, and the proposed rules go far beyond traditional common 
carriage restrictions on business.  As a result, the rules do more than simply 
make explicit an existing restriction implied in law on broadband providers‘ 
rights.  While a regulation is not a taking if it removes a right that the owner 
never had at common law, these rules go further than traditional common 
law common carriage ever would.  Therefore the proposed rules and are not 
on that basis shielded from a takings claim. 
 
2. Public Accommodations Rules 
 
The proposed rules also impose a greater burden on broadband 
providers than common law public accommodations statutes would suggest.   
Though often opaque in its reasoning, the Court has sustained certain public 
accommodations statutes against takings claims.  The two leading cases on 
this point are Heart of Atlanta Motel, which perfunctorily dismissed a Fifth 
Amendment challenge to the Civil Rights Act,
183
 and PruneYard, which 
found that the California Constitution‘s grant of a free speech right of 
access to shopping malls did not offend the Takings Clause.
184
  The upshot 
of these decisions appears to be that property owners who invite the public 
generally to their property lose at least some of their Fifth Amendment 
protections against further regulation of the right to access.
185
  In a sense, 
this line of cases echoes the common carriage restrictions placed upon 
entities that hold themselves out to serve the public indiscriminately. 
But while these cases suggest that some form of public access right 
is permissible, they are distinguishable from the Commission‘s proposed net 
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neutrality regulations in at least two ways.  First, net neutrality reaches 
beyond the access rights of end-user consumers.  The Civil Rights act and 
the state constitutional right in PruneYard hold simply that if, as an owner, 
you invite the public generally to use your property, you must do so in a 
nondiscriminatory manner.  But the Open Internet initiative is only 
indirectly concerned with end-user customers: as Phil Weiser has noted, all 
sides of the debate agree that broadband providers can discriminate among 
end-user consumers, at least in the sense of charging consumers different 
prices for different speeds of retail internet access.  Rather, net neutrality is 
concerned about the relationship between broadband providers and content 
and application providers, the ―manufacturers‖ in the internet economy who 
produce the goods that consumers seek. 
To use an offline comparison, net neutrality is akin to requiring 
Costco by to carry any and all merchandise that any vendor wishes to sell in 
the store.  Furthermore, the store is not allowed to charge for premium shelf 
space or other product placement, as is common in the retail sector, or 
otherwise profit directly from vendors‘ sale of merchandise at the store.  
Costco can earn revenue only from its annual membership fees and the sale 
of private-label merchandise in the store, but it is under strict rules that 
preclude it from dedicating more or better shelf space to its own private-
label merchandise than that of its competitors.  From this revenue it must 
manage the store and pay all overhead expenses, in a manner that does not 
threaten the ability of other vendors to sell their goods at the store.   
Put in this perspective, one quickly sees how net neutrality differs 
in magnitude from traditional public accommodations laws.  Heart of 
Atlanta Motel and PruneYard did not involve vendor access to retail 
establishments; they simply held that once an establishment opened its 
property to consumers, it could not discriminate against particular classes of 
consumers on the basis of factors unrelated to the operation of the 
establishment (such as race or political views).  In other cases, the fact that a 
claimant‘s facilities are available for public use generally has not precluded 
the court from finding a taking where the occupation is accomplished by an 
entity that is not an end-user consumer, or whose use does not lie within the 
scope of the public invitation.
186
 
Moreover, the public accommodations cases are distinguishable 
because of the retained authority of the property owner to control the 
conditions under which the public accesses to the property.  In PruneYard, 
the Court refused to find a taking in part because the mall owner could still 
―adopt[] time, place, and manner regulations that will minimize any 
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interference with its commercial functions.‖187  Because of this retained 
control over the terms of access, the Court explained that ―the fact that they 
may have ‗physically invaded‘ appellants‘ property cannot be viewed as 
determinative.‖188  The Loretto Court distinguished PruneYard on precisely 
this basis, noting that PruneYard was not a physical taking because of the 
restrictions that the mall owner could place on protesters to ―minimize 
interference with the owner‘s commercial functions.‖189   
But of course, the net neutrality restrictions do not permit 
broadband owners a comparable level of retained control over the terms of 
third-party access—indeed, the very purpose of net neutrality is to deny 
network owners the ability to place ―time, place, and manner regulations 
that [would] minimize any interference with its commercial functions.‖  The 
purpose, rather, is precisely to interfere with the owners‘ commercial 
functions, at least insofar as those commercial functions include charging 
for access to end-users or delivering bandwidth-intensive applications to 
end-users over congested networks.  As a result, the breadth of the proposed 
net neutrality rules likely takes it outside the scope of the public 
accommodations laws held to be permissible under Heart of Atlanta and 
PruneYard. 
 
III. RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE OPEN INTERNET INITIATIVE 
 
Broadband providers thus have a strong argument that the 
Commission‘s proposed net neutrality rules effect a physical taking under 
Loretto.  The physical invasion of an electronic network by a third-party 
signal is legally and physically no different from the invasion of a rooftop 
by equipment, utility poles by foreign equipment, or a beachfront lot by 
tourists.  Each involves strangers receiving an unfettered right of access to a 
defined area of private property over the objection of the property owner, in 
a way that infringes upon the owner‘s ability to exclude from, use, or 
dispose of the space so occupied.  Of course, as Cablevision notes, courts 
may have some conceptual difficulty extending the Loretto doctrine to 
electronic networks, despite the fact that the same property rights are at 
stake in both scenarios.  In that circumstance, broadband networks may fall 
back on a more general regulatory takings claim under Penn Central, which 
is arguable but not as strong under existing case law. 
But broadband providers need not have an airtight Takings Clause 
claim before they can impact the present net neutrality debate.  The fact that 
the proposed rules present a ―serious constitutional question‖ suggests that 
the Commission should reconsider its decision to promulgate net neutrality 
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restrictions without a clear mandate from Congress.  The deference 
normally afforded to administrative action under Chevron
190
 is inapplicable 
where the administrative action raises serious constitutional issues.
191
  The 
Supreme Court has explained that  
Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes 
the outer limits of Congress‘[s] power, we expect a clear 
indication that Congress intended that result.  This 
requirement stems from our prudential desire not to 
needlessly reach constitutional issues and our assumption 
that Congress does not casually authorize administrative 
agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of 
congressional authority.
192
 
The canon of constitutional avoidance carries particular importance 
in the context of the Takings Clause, where a successful claim would 
require the payment of just compensation and thus would raise separation-
of-powers concerns.  In Bell Atlantic, the D.C. Circuit explained that 
―[w]here administrative interpretation of a statute effects a taking, use of a 
narrowing construction prevents executive encroachment on Congress‘s 
exclusive powers to raise revenue and to appropriate funds.‖193  Bell 
Atlantic involved a Fifth Amendment challenge to an FCC access rule, 
promulgated without clear authorization from Congress, that required local 
telephone companies to grant competitors access to their networks.  The 
D.C. Circuit did not resolve the Fifth Amendment claim, because it did need 
to do so: rather, it found that because the petitioners‘ claim ―fairly 
implicates‖ the Takings Clause under Loretto, and the FCC lacked express 
authority from Congress to mandate access, the rule was held to be 
invalid.
194
 
Here, it is important to note that Congress has not clearly authorized 
the FCC to impose net neutrality rules on broadband providers.  If anything, 
the fact that Congress has considered but failed to pass a series of net 
neutrality bills since 2005 (most recently, a bill co-sponsored by then-
Senators Clinton and Obama during the 2008 presidential election) suggests 
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that Congress is at best unconcerned about, and at worst hostile to, such a 
proposal.
195
   
The Commission claims authority to adopt such rules only pursuant 
to its ancillary jurisdiction under Title I.  But the language of Title I does 
not clearly authorize the FCC to impose net neutrality restrictions that may 
take broadband providers‘ property rights.  Indeed, Title I does not clearly 
give the FCC authority to regulate the Internet at all.  Title I serves as an 
administrative ―necessary and proper‖ clause; it gives the FCC limited 
jurisdiction ―over matters not directly addressed in the Act when the subject 
matter falls within the agency‘s general statutory grant of jurisdiction and 
the regulation is ‗reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the 
Commission‘s various responsibilities.‘‖196  In the proposed rules, the 
Commission explained that it has explicit authority to regulate voice and 
cable video communications, and because these services are increasingly 
provided over the Internet, the Commission can regulate broadband access 
as a matter ―reasonably ancillary‖ to its voice and video duties.197  The 
Commission recently made a similar argument to the D.C. Circuit when 
defending its Comcast order, and although the decision remains pending, 
even net neutrality proponents remarked upon the skepticism that the panel 
showed for the Commission‘s jurisdictional claims.198  Indeed, the court has 
shown increasing skepticism in recent years for the Commission‘s attempts 
to promulgate extensive regulations under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction 
without express Congressional approval.
199
 
At the very least, the rules implicate a ―serious constitutional 
question‖ whether net neutrality constitutes either a physical taking under 
Loretto or a regulatory taking under Penn Central.  When coupled with the 
ongoing dialogue regarding the First Amendment implications of the 
proposed rule and the D.C. Circuit‘s skepticism regarding the scope of the 
agency‘s Title I authority to regulate internet access, the Commission would 
be better served to seek explicit Congressional authority before carrying the 
net neutrality project forward.  Without such authority, Bell Atlantic and 
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other decisions suggest that the proposed rules are unlikely to withstand 
judicial review. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
At its core, net neutrality seeks to eliminate broadband providers‘ 
rights to discriminate among third-party content providers that seek to 
distribute material on their electronic networks.  The policies implicated by 
such restrictions, and the effect upon the retained property rights of network 
owners, are issues that directly implicate the Takings Clause, because they 
extinguish broadband providers‘ right to exclude and appropriate the use of 
such networks for the public.  This paper demonstrates that the Court‘s 
physical takings jurisprudence applies to electronic networks, and that the 
Commission‘s effort to impose net neutrality rules effects a taking under 
this line of cases, which cannot be accomplished without providing just 
compensation. 
But a court reviewing the inevitable challenge to the Commission‘s 
proposed rules need not resolve whether net neutrality actually effects a 
taking under Loretto or the more ad-hoc Penn Central test.  It is sufficient to 
note that the issue presents a serious constitutional question, which 
implicates the presumption that Congress ―does not casually interpret a 
statute to push the limit of congressional authority.‖  This presumption, 
coupled with ongoing First Amendment concerns and the courts‘ general 
skepticism regarding the scope of authority the Commission claims under 
its Title I ancillary jurisdiction, should prompt the FCC to reconsider its 
effort to promulgate net neutrality rules in the absence of explicit 
congressional approval.  A refusal to do so risks judicial invalidation of 
Chairman Genachowski‘s Open Internet initiative. 
